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SUBSIDIES, COUNTERVAILING DUTIES AND
ANTIDUMPING AFTER THE TOKYO
ROUND*
John J. Barcel6 IIt
The law of subsidies, countervailing duties and antidumping has been
altered by the GATT' Tokyo Round Agreements2 and the United States
implementing legislation, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 3 This article
analyzes whether the new law of unfair trade practices advances the
conditions for liberal trade or edges toward "cooperative protectionism."
The analysis proceeds primarily from a United States perspective.
Consequently, the article focuses predominantly on the 1979 Act and only
indirectly on the new GATT agreements.
The analysis addresses, in decreasing order of consistency with liberal
trade policy-or so the article concludes-three parts of the new unfair
trade law of the United States: (1) trade retaliation under amended section
301 of the 1974 Trade Act4 (authorizing trade barriers against countries
* Copyright © 1980 by John J. Barcel6 III. All rights reserved.
t Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies, Cornell University.
B.A. 1962, J.D. 1966, Tulane University; S.J.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. The acronym GATT refers to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor
signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, and the
organization that implements the agreement. The text of the basic agreement and various
annexes are reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as
GATT].
2. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/236 [hereinafter cited
as Subsidies Code], reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1979)
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as H.R. Doc. No. 153]; Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc.
MTN/NTM/W/232 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Antidumping Code], reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 153, at 311.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A. (West
1980)).
4. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 19
U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1980).
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whose subsidies and other measures adversely affect United States trade,
including exports); (2) countervailing duty law under the new 1979 Act 5
(authorizing special duties to offset foreign subsidies on imports into the
United States); and (3) antidumping law under the 1979 Act6 (authorizing
special antidumping duties to offset the amount by which imports to the
United States undersell their home price or cost of production).7
The dominant issue in the paper is whether one can justify treating so-
called "unfair" trade more harshly than fair trade. The paper inquires
whether differentially harsh treatment of unfair trade advances the
underlying efficiency goals of a liberal trading system. It also inquires
whether there are principled notions of fairness that could support a
differentially harsh regime for unfair trade, even if the efficiency arguments
are inconclusive or unsupportive.
The next section develops the rationale within a liberal trade order for
an importing country to restrict fair trade which causes serious injury to
domestic producers. That serves as a backdrop for analyzing why, if at all,
unfair imports should be treated more harshly. The next section also
introduces the distinction between export and domestic subsidies affecting
trade. As the later discussion explains, both the new GATT Code and the
United States law treat export subsidies more harshly than domestic
subsidies. The paper examines whether this distinction is sound.
The article concludes that unfair trade law aimed at subsidized or
dumped imports is largely protectionist. There are no efficiency
justifications and only weak, if any, fairness claims for such differentially
harsh treatment. Hence the article concludes that through their acceptance
of countervailing duty and antidumping laws, the GATT countries have, in
effect, entered a market sharing arrangement under which, for protectionist
purposes, they have restricted the share accorded to subsidized and dumped
goods in their respective markets.
The article urges for reasons of simplicity, administrative efficiency
and greater consistency with liberal trade goals that a single safeguard law
be adopted as the sole standard for relief against all injurious imports. For
that purpose, the article favors the current or a slightly modified version of
5. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1671f(West 1980) (adding
new §§ 70 1-707 to the Tariff Act of 1930).
6. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-1673i (West 1980) (adding
new §§ 731-740 to the Tariff Act of 1930).
7. The 6ost of production standard was added by the Trade Act of 1974, § 321(d), 19
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976) (amending the Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 205, 42 Stat. 1I) and
has been reenacted in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 773(b), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(b)
(West 1980).
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the United States escape clause.8 Under the escape clause, in contrast to the
unfair trade laws, the injury standard is higher, increased tariffs or
adjustment subsidies are temporary and relief is discretionary with the
President and Congress. The article supports retention of a trade retaliation
law in addition to the escape clause, especially when the former is used to
prevent foreign subsidies from displacing United States exports. It also
agrees with harsher treatment, under the retaliation law, for export as
opposed to domestic subsidies.
The analysis underlying these conclusions is given in Sections II (trade
retaliation), III (countervailing duties) and IV (antidumping).
I
FAIR AND UNFAIR TRADE
A. PROTECTION AGAINST MARKET DISRUPTION
The repeated efforts of GATT signatories to reduce trade barriers
through multilateral agreement 9 is premised on the comparative advantage
theory that all nations will gain in wealth from specialization and trade.
Despite this commitment to the long-term benefits of liberal trade, no na-
tion is prepared to pay heavy short-term costs when market disruption from
imports reaches an excessive level. The costs take the form of unemploy-
ment, increased welfare payments, under-utilized resources, relocation ex-
penses and the intangible individual burdens of sudden uprootment. In this
situation, a nation might improve its welfare by temporarily denying itself
the benefit of cheap imports so that its own producers may adjust gradually
to increased import competition. The adjustments might consist of invest-
ment for increased efficiency, or a gradual shifting of resources into other
lines of production. Optimal government intervention would take the form
of temporary subsidies to the ailing industry to encourage the appropriate
adjustment, thus allowing consumers to continue to enjoy cheap imports.
For fiscal, administrative and political reasons, however, governments often
opt for increased trade barriers instead.' 0
There is nothing normatively wrongful or unfair about "disruptive"
trade. The restrictions imposed by the importing country are against "fair"
imports which, if absorbed within a short period, cause excessive adjust-
ment costs. Since this logic will not support selective barriers against partic-
8. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
9. See generalo K. DAM, THE GATT, LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 56-78 (1970); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 217-23 (1969).
10. For a general discussion of the theoretical basis for protection against market disrup-
tion, see Meier, Externality Law and Market Safeguards: Applications in the GA 7TMultilateral
Trade Negotiations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 500-06 (1977).
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ular countries, the GATT requires that restrictions against fair trade
conform to the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle (nondiscrimina-
tion). I" Thus, the reduced trade flow will continue to come from the most
efficient producer countries. Under current rules the country invoking pro-
tection against fair trade should also offer trade concessions on other prod-
ucts to offset the damage to the exporting countries.' 2 The principle is one
of equitable sharing of the temporary burdens of adjusting to altered trade
flows consistent with an overriding concern for efficiency.
By contrast, protection against "unfair" trade seems to rest on the be-
lief that subsidization or dumping is wrongful.' 3 Under current GATT
rules, no country need adjust substantially to such practices; protection
must be selective (against only the wrongful imports) and may be perma-
nent. 14 The importing country need not compensate trading partners for
action against unfair trade, and those partners, correspondingly, have no
right of retaliation.15 Most tellingly, the threshold of injury required to
trigger barriers against "unfair" imports is lower than that for "fair" im-
ports. ' 6
This description of the unfair trade concept underscores that it is not
the excessive cost of market disruption per se which justifies the counter-
vailing action, but essentially the wrongfulness of the unfair practice. Thus,
to be sound, differentially harsh treatment of unfair trade requires some
principled notion of why subsidies and dumping are wrongful. (This paper
concentrates primarily on the problem of subsidies, and discusses the new
antidumping law only briefly in the last section.)
The search for a principled notion of wrongfulness proceeds in the pa-
per along two avenues. One inquiry seeks to identify "extra" costs to a
complaining country caused by subsidies-costs that are different from
those of non-subsidized trade. A second inquiry seeks some principled no-
11. See, e.g., GATT Arts. I, XIX; J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 564.
12. See GATT Art. XIX; J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 565-66. If agreement on compensa-
tion is not reached, an exporting country is authorized to retaliate.
13. For an explanation of the United States antidumping law (and implicitly the counter-
vailing duty law) in similar terms, see Hudec, United States Compliance with the 1967 GA 7T
Antidumping Code, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUDIES 205, 206-07 (1979).
14. Contrast the permanent and selective nature of antidumping and contervailing duties
in GATT Art. VI, with the impliedly temporary and nondiscriminatory escape clause action
authorized in GATT Art. XIX.
15. GATT Article VI authorizes countervailing and antidumping duties without any ref-
erence to compensation or a right of retaliation.
16. The GATT calls for "serious injury" under the escape clause, GATT Art. XIX(I)(a),
but only "material injury" for countervailing and antidumping duties, GATT Art. VI(6)(a).
For a discussion of the different tests under United States law, see the text accompanying notes
75-82 infra.
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tion of equity or fair play that could justify harsher treatment of subsidized
trade.
The paper concludes that harsh reaction to subsidized trade is more
justified when the complaint involves loss of markets in third countries (the
subject in part of trade retaliation law) than when it concerns incursions of
subsidized imports into the home market of (the subject of the counter-
vailing duty law). Important distinctions between export and domestic sub-
sidies are discussed in the next subsection because they cut across the later
analysis of the trade retaliation and countervailing duty laws.
B. EXPORT AND DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES
The term "export subsidy," as used throughout this article, means a
subsidy conditioned on export of the product or on export performance.
Domestic subsidies-primarily production subsidies-are those granted
without respect to output destination. 17
Traditionally, the GATT has been more hostile to export than to
domestic subsidies' 8 for several reasons. First, an export subsidy appears
aggressive, especially to an importing country facing serious market disrup-
tion from imports. Although the exporting country will almost never aim
such subsidies specifically at a troubled market, the subsidy nevertheless
represents a direct attempt by the subsidizing government to gain a greater
share of foreign markets. Second, export subsidies help national products
climb foreign tariff walls. Such subsidies may thus seem to subvert the le-
gitimate tariff policy of an importing country.' 9 Third, an export subsidy,
as an intervention confined to the trade sector, is equivalent to a negative
tariff. Like a tariff, it clashes with the efficiency goals of liberal trade.20 It
distorts resource allocation and, by opening a gap in price (or
17. For a similar distinction between domestic (production) and export subsidies, see H.
MALMGREN, INTERNATIONAL ORDER FOR PUBLIC SUBSIDIES 28 (1977); W. WALKER, INTER-
NATIONAL LIMITS TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE MARKETPLACE 8 (1976). Al-
though neither GATT nor the Subsidies Code defines the term "export subsidy," all of the
practices on the illustrative list of prohibited "export subsidies" in the Code Annex meet the
definition in the text. See Subsidies Code, supra note 2, Annex ("Illustrative List of Export
Subsidies"), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 295-97. This list appears at note 32 infra.
18. See Barcel6, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties-Analysis and a Proposal, 9 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779, 782-85 (1977).
19. See WALKER, supra note 17, at 10. See also P. BIDWELL, THE INVISIBLE TARIFF 87
(1939).
20. For a more thorough development of this point, see Barcel6, supra note 18, at 794-99.
That article discusses several exceptions to the general rule that export subsidies are distortive
and should be prohibited. Id. at 801-23. The new Code is consistent with several of the pro-
posed exceptions. The prohibited list in the Code Annex excludes the rebate of excise taxes, if
nonexcessive, and includes export credit terms only if in violation of international undertak-
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its equivalent) between export and domestic sales,2 t also distorts con-
sumption.
One cannot meet the efficiency challenge to export subsidies by argu-
ing that the subsidy advances a collective purpose or noneconomic goal.
Except for cases of economic or military aid, no country has a plausible
collective interest in exporting an above-market quantity of a particular
good.22 An export subsidy is also not an efficient corrective policy for a
market distortion in the internal economy. If a government seeks corrective
action, that action should be tied closely to the original distortion; hence, if
a subsidy is entailed, it should be a domestic, not an export subsidy.23
Ironically, the inefficiencies stemming from misguided subsidies afflict
primarily the subsidizing country itself. Thus, GATT rules prohibiting ex-
ings. Developing countries need only agree to eliminate export subsidies gradually. See Sub-
sidies Code, supra note 2, art. 14(5)-(6), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 284-85.
For an analysis challenging the argument that export subsidies are inefficient, see Schwartz,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States. Countervailing Duties and the Regulation of International
Trade, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 297, 304-08. Schwartz emphasizes the theoretical possibility of
externalities in the export sector, and the complexity and cost of deciding that "too much"
subsidy has been paid or the net preference effect on any product, given the magnitude and
variety of government action affecting production.
Although the suggestion that externalities in the export sector justify export subsidies is the-
oretically sound, few commonly found export subsidies seem consistent with that rationale.
Government information aids and promotional fairs for exports are possible exceptions. See
note 23 infra; Barcel6, supra note 18, at 802. Disregarding these exceptions, however, the
unwillingness of governments to rely upon non-discriminatory market principles to handle
balance of payments difficulties and the political influence of particular export industries who
argue the need to expand exports for the health of the industry appear more readily to explain
the export subsidies found in practice. Such industries also occasionally argue the need to
overcome the disadvantages of an "overvalued" exchange rate. This last argument might jus-
tify a uniform percentage subsidy for all exports, but not a selective subsidy limited to certain
industries.
21. There will be a price gap because transport costs or government regulation (including
possibly a tariff) will prevent the re-importation of the subsidized goods at a price undercutting
the domestic market. Otherwise, the subsidy policy would defeat its purpose.
22. Political, fiscal and administrative reasons may support the use of an export subsidy
instead of domestic subsidy when a country seeks a noneconomic internal goal. It may be
politically possible to enact an export subsidy, but not a domestic subsidy. This argument is
weak, however, since fiscal and administrative factors appear roughly equivalent when choos-
ing between applying a given government expenditure to allproduction, or only to that pro-
duction exported.
23. Only if a distortion is confined to the export sector would an export subsidy be optimal
policy. For example, in an infant export industry no single firm may have an incentive to
develop an export market because other firms will gain cost-free access once the market is
opened. Perhaps in this situation, government information aids, market surveys and promo-
tional fairs for exports should not be considered presumptively inefficient. Of course, such
subsidies should only be temporary. See Schwartz & Harper, The Regulation of Subsidies Af-
fecting International Trade, 70 MicH. L. REV. 831, 847 (1972) (arguing that subsidies, includ-
ing export subsidies are not presumptively distortive); see also Barcel6, supra note 18, at 802.
Other examples of distortion-corrective export subsidies, however, are not readily apparent.
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port subsidies benefit the very countries against whom they operate. Such
rules, like those limiting import barriers, increase a government's bargain-
ing position with highly organized special interests who may benefit from
export subsidies at the expense of the general interest. The inefficiencies of
export subsidies, however, also reduce global welfare. How such global in-
efficiencies affect the interests of non-subsidizing countries is analyzed be-
low in connection with the trade retaliation and countervailing duty laws.24
Domestic subsidies are not as vulnerable to arguments of aggressive-
ness and inefficiency. Domestic subsidies are the counterpart of domestic
taxes, which, unlike tariffs, are not closely regulated by GATT.25 Although
domestic subsidies may increase the subsidizing country's export flow, they
generally carry none of the aggressive overtones of export subsidies. They
are normally aimed at legitimate internal socio-economic goals, not at ex-
panding the country's share of foreign markets.
In addition, domestic subsidies are not presumptively inefficient or dis-
tortive of "proper" trade flow. In the first place, "market imperfections"
riddle the economy of every country, thus preventing the real-world market
from operating under conditions of perfect competition to achieve the social
optimum in resource allocation and output distribution. Such market im-
perfections may consist of monopolistic influences in product or factor mar-
kets, or external costs or benefits to society not captured by the private
market. Under these conditions, a domestic subsidy may be the optimal
corrective policy. A domestic subsidy would expand production or factor-
use restricted by monopolies or allow society to reap benefits denied it by
private decision-making. When distortions or imperfections in the market
are not confined to the export sector-and generally they are not--export
subsidies are a non-optimal solution. They may encourage increased pro-
duction, but they simultaneously distort the market by preventing consum-
ers from buying at the lower world price. If a subsidy is entailed, a
domestic subsidy, as the policy tied most closely to the source of the prob-
lem,26 will best correct internal market distortions.
Second, governments often intervene in the market to pursue so-called
noneconomic goals or "collective goods."'27 For example, a nation may de-
sire self-sufficiency in oil for enhanced national security, redistribution of
wealth to depressed regions, or a more prosperous farm population. The
24. See notes 53-54, 119-39 infra and accompanying text.
25. GATT Article 111(2) merely requires that such taxes not discriminate against imports.
26. For more thorough discussion of this essential point, see Barcelr, supra note 18, at
788-92.
27. "Collective goods," sometimes termed "public goods," are those goods desired or de-
manded by the nation as a whole but unachievable through the private market. See generally
C. KINDLEBERGER, GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1978).
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private market alone may be inadequate for these purposes. A government
policy advancing such aims is "inefficient" only if the goal is nationally
undesirable or if the cost is excessive. But the existence of a subsidy per se
cannot establish, or even suggest, either of these conclusions. Since any
government can defend a domestic subsidy as a collective payment for a
public good its people desire and "consume" collectively, notions of pre-
sumptive inefficiency seem untenable.
Nevertheless, domestic subsidies may have adverse effects on other
countries. They may reduce the exports of those countries to third country
markets, or to the subsidizing country itself. They may also increase the
flow of imports into a country complaining of market disruption. If the
subsidy eliminates a market distortion in the subsidizing country, however,
it is entirely consistent with comparative advantage and not in any sense
"wrongful."
On the other hand, if the subsidy is for a socio-economic, collective
purpose, such as full employment in a certain region or industry, the issue
of wrongfulness or unfairness is more complex. Countries frequently share
the collective goals underlying domestic subsidies. For example, when an
important industry, such as steel, faces global overcapacity, each producing
country wants to avoid diminished production and serious unemployment
in its own industry. Thus, more of the collective good desired by country A
may mean less of the collective good available for country B. This classic
pattern calls for compromise and agreed solutions, however, not rules of
presumptive wrongfulness or unfairness. The 1979 trade retaliation law
takes the former approach, whereas the 1979 countervailing duty law takes
the latter. The next two sections turn to a separate analysis of these differ-
ent statutory approaches to unfair trade.
II
TRADE RETALIATION
The 1979 Act amends the President's trade retaliation authority in sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 197428 to allow the United States to enforce its
rights under the so-called Track II provisions of the Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Duty Code.2 9 Those rights derive from Code provisions limiting the
28. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 901, 19
U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1980). For a general discussion of trade retaliation under section 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974 before the 1979 Act changes, and of the relationship of the prior law to
GATT, see Hudec, Retaliation Against "Unreasonable"Foreign Trade Practices: The New Sec-
tion 301 and G74TT Nullofcation and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 461 (1975).
29. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 257. "Track II" is the term used
by government negotiators for the government-to-government complaint procedure. See AM.
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use of certain subsidies. For example, the Code contains an outright prohi-
bition on "export subsidies" to manufactured and mineral products, 30
which does not depend, as before, on exports being at a lower price than
domestic sales.3 1 The Annex to the Subsidies Code contains an illustrative
list of prohibited export subsidies, all of which condition the subsidy in
some manner on export or export performance. 32 On the other hand, the
Code recognizes domestic subsidies as legitimate for internal social and ec-
SOC. OF INT'L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD ANNUAL MEETING 66-70 (1979) (remarks of
C. Fred Bergsten, Asst. Secty. for Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Track II includes
Articles 7-19 of the Subsidies Code, supra note 2, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 276-94.
30. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 9, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 278. The Code imposes
less severe restrictions on export subsidies to agricultural products. These are impermissible
only if they give the subsidizing country "more than an equitable share of world export trade"
in the subsidized product, Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 10(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 278,
measuring the market shares in "the three most recent calendar years in which normal market
conditions existed." Id. arts. 10(1), (2)(c), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 278, 279. "More than an
equitable share" includes any case where the subsized goods "displace the exports of another
signatory" in established markets. Id. art. 10(2)(a), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 279. In determining
"equitable share" in new markets, the Code takes into account "traditional patterns of supply
of the product concerned to the world market, region, or country in which the new market is
situated." Id. art. 10(2)(b), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 279. The Code also prohibits export subsi-
dies on agricultural products to a particular market which result in "prices materially below
those of other suppliers to the same market." 1d. art. 10(3), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 279. Refer-
ence throughout this article to "prohibited export subsidies" means export subsidies to manu-
factured and mineral products, and those to agricultural products that violate the Subsidies
Code principles outlined above.
31. The prior rule still applies to GATT signatories who are not signatories of the Subsi-
dies Code. See GATT Art. XVI(B)(4).
32. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, Annex, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 295-97. This list con-
tains-with some additions, clarifications and minor changes-all the items on the 1960
GATT Working Party list generally understood to have been prohibited by GATT Article
XVI(B)(4). See BISD (9th Supp.) 185, 186-87 (1961). For a reprint of the list and discussion,
see J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 382-87. The new list contains the following prohibitions:
(a) Direct subsidies to firms contingent on export performance.
(b) Currency retention schemes involving a bonus on exports.
(c) Internal transport charges-mandated by government-for export shipments on
terms more favorable than for domestic shipments.
(d) Delivery by government of goods or services for production of exported goods on
terms more favorable than for domestic goods and than commercially available.
(e) On exports, rebate or deferral of direct taxes or social welfare charges.
(f) Allowance of special deductions directly related to exports in calculating direct
taxes.
(g) On exports, rebate of indirect taxes in excess of those levied on goods consumed
domestically.
(h) On exports, rebate or deferral of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes, unless
levied on goods physically incorporated in the exported product (not applicable
to value-added-tax, which may be rebated under (g) above, see Code Annex,
note 3).
(i) Drawback of import duties in excess of those levied on imported goods physically
incorporated in the exported product.
(j) Government export credit or guarantees against cost increases or exchange risk at
rates inadequate to cover long-term operating costs of the program.
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onomic purposes. 33 Under the Code, the subsidizing country agrees to try
to avoid causing adverse effects to the interests of other signatories, particu-
larly "where such subsidies would adversely affect the conditions of normal
competition.' ' 34 Thus, the Track II provisions reflect the differences be-
tween export and domestic subsidies just discussed.
The trade retaliation provisions of section 301 constitute the only real-
istic remedy for damage to U.S. trade interests when foreign subsidies dis-
place or impede American exports. Section 301 is also available when
foreign subsidies increase the flow of imports into the United States. In that
case, however, the retaliation law overlaps the countervailing duty law
(Track I of the Code),35 and either remedy is available.
The deterrent force of Track II is maximized when a signatory uses an
export subsidy inconsistent with the Code. The Track II provisions author-
ize a government-to-government complaint and a dispute settlement proce-
dure subject to strict time limits. 36 If the complaining government
establishes that a signatory has used a prohibited export subsidy, the Code
creates a presumption of adverse effects to the complainant. 37 If the subsi-
dizing country fails to rebut that presumption 38 or reach a settlement, the
Committee of Code Signatories would presumably authorize trade retalia-
tion.39
(k) Government export credit at rates below the cost of funds employed, unless con-
sistent with an international undertaking on export credits to which 12 of the
original signatories of the Code are parties.
(1) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy under
GATT Article XVI.
33. The Subsidies Code expressly approves the following objectives of subsidy programs:
aid to disadvantaged regions; decentralization of industry; adjustment assistance to ailing sec-
tors; encouragement of research and development; implementation of development plans by
developing countries; and sustaining employment and encouraging employment programs.
Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 1 (I), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 279-80.
34. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 11(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 280-81.
35. Track I includes Articles 1-6 of the Subsidies Code, supra note 2, H.R. Doc. No. 153,
at 261-75. See generally notes 55-118 infra and accompanying text.
36. See Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 12, 13, 17-19, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 282, 283,
288-94.
37. Although Article 8, n.4 provides that such a presumption "may" arise, Articles 12(1)
and 13(4) plainly imply that the complaining government has no burden of showing adverse
effects if a prohibited export subsidy has been used. Cf Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art.
14(4), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 284 ("There shall be no presumption that export subsidies
granted by developing country signatories result in adverse effects. . .") (emphasis added).
38. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 8 n.4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 277.
39. Id. arts. 13(4), 17, 18, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 283, 288, 288-91. Since the Committee
must consider "the nature and degree of the adverse effects found to exist" before authorizing
"appropriate countermeasures," Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 18(9), 13(4), H.R. Doc.
No. 153, at 291, 283, a complaining government might have to introduce some evidence of
adverse effects before the Committee will authorize retaliation.
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If the complaint attacks a domestic subsidy, however, the complaining
government must prove that the subsidy has adversely affected its interests,
either by reducing its exports or by damaging its domestic industry through
increased imports.4 0 Even if the complainant makes such a showing, the
Committee of Signatories could still conclude that the subsidy did not
"cause injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice," and refuse
to authorize retaliation.4' That conclusion might result from a finding that
the subsidy did not "adversely affect the conditions of normal competi-
tion."4 2 Presumably, the Committee might so find if the domestic subsidy
merely corrected a prior market distortion, or, in the case of a regional sub-
sidy, for example, merely offset the added expense of locating in the disad-
vantaged region.
Under the 1979 Act, a private petition to the United States Trade Rep-
resentative (formerly the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) 43
can trigger United States retaliation rights under Track II of the Code.44 If
the Trade Representative decides to open an investigation, the Act instructs
him to invoke the Track II dispute settlement procedure simultaneously.
Failing a negotiated settlement, the Trade Representative must recommend
to the President appropriate retaliatory action.45 The Act carefully coordi-
nates the time limits for such a recommendation to permit exhaustion of the
Code's dispute settlement procedure.4 6 In a private petition case, the Presi-
dent must decide what action to take, if any, within twenty-one days of the
Trade Representative's recommendation,4 7 which has no binding force.
Counting that period and the initial forty-five days allowed for the decision
whether to open an investigation, the Act limits the total lapsed time from
petition to Presidential decision in an export subsidy case to approximately
40. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 12(3)-(4), 8(3)-(4), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 282, 277-
78.
41. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 13(4), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 282.
42. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 11(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 280-81.
43. See Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
44. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2412-2413 (West 1980). For the Trade Representative's new regula-
tions under amended section 301, see 45 Fed. Reg. 34,870 (1980) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
pt. 2006).
45. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414 (West 1980).
46. Compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(1)(A) (West 1980) (allowing 7 months for the Trade
Representative's recommendation in a case involving an export subsidy prohibited by the Sub-
sidies Code) with Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 13(l), 17 and 18, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at
283, 288, 288-91 (allowing 180 days from preliminary request for consultation to final Commit-
tee recommendation), and compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(1)(B) (West 1980) (allowing 8
months for the Trade Representative's recommendation in a case involving a domestic sub-
sidy) with Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 13(2), 17 and 18, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 283, 288,
288-91 (allowing 210 days).
47. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c)(2) (West 1980).
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nine months, 48 and in a domestic subsidy case to approximately ten
months.49
The President has complete discretion whether to retaliate against the
trade of an offending country. 50 The Act does not expressly condition his
authority upon the Committee of Signatories' authorization nor does it
limit the degree of retaliation he may employ. On the other hand, the Code
obligates the United States not to retaliate against signatories without au-
thorization of the Committee of Signatories.5 1 If the Committee authorizes
retaliation, it must take into account the nature and degree of the subsidy-
caused adverse effect to the interests of the complaining government.5 2
These new provisions of the 1979 Act comport reasonably well with
liberal trade policy. The Act reserves harshest treatment for export subsi-
dies, which are generally inconsistent with the efficiency principles underly-
ing comparative advantage. When such subsidies curtail American exports
to third countries, they reduce global efficiency and unambiguously injure
United States interests. Such subsidies force U.S. producers to shift re-
sources into less efficient lines of output, American consumers do not bene-
fit from low-priced imports, and the subsidy-created inefficiencies may
indirectly increase the cost of other imports to the United States. 5 3 These
detrimental effects coupled with the general absence of independent justifi-
cation for export subsidies support placing the burden on the subsidizing
country to show an absence of displacement, as provided under Track II of
the Code.
Domestic subsidies abroad can have similar adverse effects upon U.S.
interests by deterring American exports to third countries and to the subsi-
dizing country itself. But whether such subsidies are inefficient, unfair in a
broader sense, or unjustified will rarely be unambiguous. To resolve dis-
putes, the Code requires the Committee of Signatories to decide-with the
complainant country bearing the burden of proof-whether a given domes-
tic subsidy seriously displaces a complainant country's exports and perhaps
48. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a) (West 1980) (45 days for Trade Representative to decide
whether to initiate investigation); 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(1)(A) (West 1980) (7 months for rec-
ommendation of the Trade Representative); 19 U.S.C.A. § 241 1(c)(2) (West 1980) (21 days for
President's decision).
49. See id, except that in a domestic subsidy case 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a)(1)(B) (West 1980)
allows 8 months for the recommendation of the Trade Representative.
50. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1980). The President may act under any existing authority,
for example, that granted in § 125 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2135 (1976), or under
the express grant of retaliatory authority in the 1979 Act. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(b) (West
1980).
51. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 19(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 291.
52. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 18(9), 13(4), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 291, 283. See
note 39 supra.
53. See notes 133-39 infra and accompanying text.
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also whether it "adversely affects the conditions of normal competition." 54
The incentive to compromise likely to emerge from this process seems a
reasonable and necessary approach to the potential clash of legitimate sov-
ereign policies.
The case against export and domestic subsidies is much weaker, how-
ever, when they feed imports into the United States, although neither the
Act nor Track II of the Code makes this distinction. The President can take
consumer benefits into account, however, when exercising his discretion
under the trade retaliation law. The nondiscretionary countervailing duty
law, on the other hand, raises more acutely the question whether special
restrictions on bounty-fed imports are sound.
III
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
A. THE TRADE AGREEMENTS AcT OF 1979
The new countervailing duty law under the 1979 Act has four distinc-
tive features: (1) a more explicit and broad ranging definition of the term
"subsidy; ' "5 (2) a new injury test for dutiable imports; 56 (3) a new provi-
sional remedy available early in the investigation;57 and (4) a new adjudica-
tory cast to the proceedings, including restricted agency discretion to define
subsidies and a right to Customs Court review of various preliminary and
final decisions.58 The new law applies only to signatories of the Tokyo
Round Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Code, or countries that have
accepted equivalent obligations.5 9 Prior United States law-including the
absence of an injury test on dutiable imports-will apply to countries that
reject the Code and its prohibition of export subsidies. 60 The 1979 Act also
expedites the procedure so that normal cases will last no longer than eight
54. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 11(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 280-81.
55. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)-(6) (West 1980). See notes 83-91 infra and accompanying text.
56. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671, 1677(7) (West 1980). The prior law provided an injury test only
for non-dutiable products. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976) (amended 1979). See notes 75-82 infra
and accompanying text.
57. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(b) (West 1980). See notes 92-95 infra and accompanying text.
58. For the provision authorizing Customs Court review, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516(a) (West
1980). See notes 96-114 infra and accompanying text.
59. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(b)(1)-(2) (West 1980). The new law also applies to a limited group
of countries who are not GATT members but to whom the United States owes unconditional
MFN treatment under other trade agreements. Id. § 1671(b)(3). Countries includable in this
latter category are listed in S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT] (El Salvador, Honduras, Liberia, Nepal, North Yemen, Paraguay, and Vene-
zuela).
60. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(c) (West 1980). The old law requires that countervailing duties on
dutiable products be imposed without an injury test. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
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months6 1 and "extraordinarily complicated" cases no longer than ten
months.62 Although the new injury test discourages countervailing duty re-
lief, the weakness of that test, the expedited procedure, the new provisional
remedy, the reduced agency discretion and the general adjudicatory cast to
the proceedings seem likely, in the balance, to increase the number of com-
plaints filed.
Even if the injury test, despite its weakness, counterbalances the other
features of the 1979 law so that on the whole the new law is not more pro-
tectionist than past countervailing duty law,63 the question remains whether
any such law can be justified. A comparison of the new countervailing duty
law with the escape clause provisions applicable to all trade illustrates that
the former remedy is plainly more protectionist than the latter.
For escape clause relief against "fair trade" a complainant must first
prove before the International Trade Commission (ITC) that increased im-
ports have been a "substantial cause" of "serious injury" to a domestic in-
dustry.64 The ITC must then recommend to the President the degree and
form of trade restriction needed to remedy the injury. Finally the Presi-
dent, at his discretion, 65 must decide whether to adopt: (1) the trade restric-
tion recommended; (2) a different kind or degree of restriction; (3)
adjustment assistance (various forms of financial and technical assistance to
firms and workers);66 or (4) no remedy.67 The President's decision is not
reviewable. If that decision differs from the relief recommended by the
ITC, however, Congress may by concurrent resolution reject it and adopt
61. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(b) (West 1980) (after petition is filed 85 days for preliminary
decision on existence of a subsidy); id. § 1671d(a) (75 days for final determination of existence
of a subsidy); id. § 167 1(b)(3) (75 days for final injury determinations).
62. An "extraordinarily complicated" case adds an extra 65 days to the time for the pre-
liminary determination of whether a subsidy exists. 19 U.S.C.A. § 167 1b(c)(1) (West 1980).
63. The former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tariff Affairs at the Department of Treas-
ury, Peter D. Ehrenhaft, has recently observed that the expected flood of complaints under the
1979 countervailing duty law has not as yet occurred. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA), at B-4
(July 16, 1980) (interview with Ehrenhaft). Some of the recent no injury findings ofthe ITC to
which Ehrenhaft attributed the fall off in complaints were nevertheless explained by the ITC
chairman, William Alberger, as owing in part to the presence in the caseload of several com-
plaints initiated under the old law, which required no evidence of injury. U.S. IMPORT
WEEKLY (BNA), at B-3 (July 23, 1980) (interview with Alberger).
64. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976). A "substantial cause" is one that is important and not
less than any other cause. Id. § 2251(b)(4).
65. The President's discretion under the escape clause allows him to weigh the effects of
compensating tariff concessions, which under GATT, must be offered to adversely affected
countries. If the United States does not offer acceptable concessions, those countries have a
right to retaliate against U.S. trade. GATT Art. XIX. See J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 564-66.
66. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2322 (1976) (adjustment assistance to workers); 19
U.S.C. §§ 2341-2354 (1976) (adjustment assistance to firms).
67. See generally 19 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2253 (1976) (President's range of choices and discre-
tion).
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the ITC's recommendation. 68 Escape clause trade restrictions are limited to
five years, although a three-year extension is possible.69
In contrast, the 1979 countervailing duty law mandates relief if the ap-
propriate agencies make the necessary statutory findings. Presidential dis-
cretion plays no part in the process. The Administering Authority (now the
Commerce Department)70 determines whether imports are subsidized 7'
and the ITC decides if a domestic industry is "materially injured. . . by
reason of" subsidized imports. 72 If Commerce and the ITC answer these
questions affirmatively, customs officers must levy countervailing duties
equal to the ad valorem amount of the subsidy on all offending imports. 73
The extra duties remain in effect as long as the imports are subsidized and
cause injury. Under GATT and the Subsidies Code, the subsidizing gov-
emnment has no right of retaliation.74 A closer look at the concepts and
procedures of the new countervailing duty law just summarized will better
illustrate the greater restrictiveness of that law by comparison with the es-
cape clause.
1. Material Injury and Causation
United States adherence to the Subsidies Code satisfied a long-stand-
ing effort of the other Code signatories to have the United States include a
material injury test in its countervailing duty law.75 In the 1979 Act imple-
menting the Code, however, Congress partly undercut that achievement by
defining "material injury" as "harm which is not inconsequential, immate-
rial, or unimportant. ' 76 Both the Senate and House Reports explained that
the "material injury" standard was to be generally the same as the test the
ITC applied in antidumping cases after the Trade Act of 1974.77 That
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1976).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h) (1976).
70. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5(a)(1)(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
71. 19 U.S.C.A. § 167 l(a)(1) (West 1980). For Commerce's new countervailing duty regu-
lations, see 45 Fed. Reg. 4,937-52 (1980) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.0-355.44).
72. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(2) (West 1980). The new Act authorizes the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties upon a showing of material injury, threat of material injury, or material retar-
dation of the establishment of a United States industry. Id. This article will use the term
"material injury" to include all three concepts. For the ITC's new regulations on the material
injury determination, see 44 Fed. Reg. 76,458-76 (1980) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-
207.51).
73. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671e (West 1980).
74. See GATT Art. VI; Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 4, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 267-70.
75. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 40.
76. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(A) (West 1980). Assuming the concept "material injury" covers
a range of business injury, Congress's definition plainly aims at the very lowest end of that
range.
77. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 87; H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46
(1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
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cutoff date omits some of the most indefensible ITC injury decisions in the
late sixties and early seventies, 78 but the post-1974 decisions still apply a
weak test, clearly softer than the "serious injury" standard under the escape
clause.79
The new Act also adopts the causation requirement of the prior
antidumping law; material injury must be "by reason of' the subsidized
imports.80 The Senate and House Reports state explicitly that this standard
is to be less demanding than the "substantial cause" test under the escape
clause.81 Unlike the escape clause, the new Act omits a weighing of the
effects from subsidized imports against other causes of business harm.82
Taken together, the material injury and causation requirements of the
1979 Act significantly relax the more rigorous injury threshold of the escape
clause. To keep these two thresholds distinct, the analysis below will refer
to the higher standard under the escape clause asfirst-level injury, and the
lower standard under the countervailing duty law as second-level injury.
2. Definition of Subsidies
The broad-ranging and inflexible definition of subsidies introduced by
the new law compounds the effect of the soft injury test. The new Act de-
fines "subsidy" to include the terms "bounty or grant" under the prior law
and incorporates expressly, but nonexclusively, the Code's list of prohibited
export subsidies.83 That list is generally consistent with the prior inter-
pretation of the "bounty or grant" concept.8 4 The major change under the
78. The House Report expressly rejected the "de minimis" test employed in ITC decisions
in the late sixties. See HOUSE REPORT, id. at 46. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at
87. For a discussion of the ITC cases, see Barcel6, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-
The United States and the International 1ntidumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 544-58
(1972).
79. See Barcel6, TheAntidumping Law.- Repeal lt or Revise It, I MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUDIES 53, 54-57 (1979) (comparing the injury test under the escape clause with the injury
test under the antidumping law, as amended by The Trade Act of 1974).
80. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(2) (West 1980).
81. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 57-58, 74-75; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 77, at 47.
82. Id.
83. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5) (West 1980).
84. Compare the list, summarized in note 32 supra, with the discussion of prevailing coun-
tervailing duty policy in Feller, Countervailing Duties, in I LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 123-34 (W. Surrey & D. Wallace 2d ed. 1977). See also
Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in International
Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 96-124 (1969); Feller, Mutiny.Against the Bounty. An Examination
of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 17, 19-38 (1969).
The Code's allowance of non-excessive rebates of excise taxes, see Subsidies Code, supra
note 2, Annex (g), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 295, is consistent with prior Treasury practice re-
cently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443,
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new law lies in the definition of domestic subsidies. Prior to the Michelin
Tire case in 1973,85 Treasury had never countervailed against a domestic
subsidy.86 Although it has done so increasingly since then,87 Treasury has
consistently attempted to maintain flexibility and discretion, and to empha-
size "trade distortion" effects rather than the mere conferral of a govern-
ment benefit. 88 The new law tightens the definition of domestic subsidies,
and tilts toward the government benefit theory by failing to include a "trade
distortion" requirement 89 and by narrowing the permissible offsets in calcu-
lating the "net subsidy." 90 For example, government grants to encourage
location in a depressed region can no longer be reduced by offsetting the
increased costs of locating in the region.9' The upshot is that more govern-
ment benefits to industry-especially domestic benefits-will be considered
"subsidies" subject to countervailing action than under prior law.
461-62 (1978). For a cogent analysis of the Zenith case and a penetrating critique of the coun-
tervailing duty law, see Schwartz, note 20 supra.
The Code's disallowance of rebates of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes unless levied on
goods physically incorporated in the exported product, is also consistent with a recent refine-
ment in Treasury treatment of this issue (the taxes occultes issue). See 44 Fed. Reg. 3,478
(1979). Treasury (now Commerce) adopted this approach in its proposed countervailing duty
regulations. See Countervailing Duties, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,047 (1979) (to be codified in 19
C.F.R. § 155.1). The applicable rule (§ 155.1) is not yet final, although Commerce officially
promulgated most of the new countervailing duty regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4,937-52
(1980) (to be codified in 19 C.F.R. §§ 355.0-355.44). Regulations concerning the determination
and calculation of net subsidies, specifically §§ 155.1-.4, 155.7(j), 155.51, and 155.60-.64 are
deferred. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4,932, 4,933, 4,937 (1980). (These sections, when promulgated, will
be renumbered to §§ 355.1-.4, etc.). The physical incorporation rule for prior stage taxes, how-
ever, has been formally proclaimed by Commerce in an annex to the promulgated rules. See
Annex 1, 45 Fed. Reg. 4,949 (1980).
85. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 7 Cust. B. & Dec. 24, 38 Fed. Reg. 1,018
(1973).
86. See 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 237 (1974).
87. See, e.g., Tomato Products From the European Community, 13 Cust. B. & Dec. 24,44
Fed. Reg. 49,248 (1979) (production subsidy to offset price supports on tomatoes); Certain
Optic Liquid Level Sensing Systems From Canada, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,728 (1979) (research and
development grant); Certain Fish From Canada, 44 Fed. Reg. 1,372 (1979) (regional and other
grants to fishing industry); Float Glass From Italy, 10 Cust. B. & Dec. 23, 41 Fed. Reg. 1,274
(1976) (regional subsidy).
88. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals recently struck down the Treasury's "trade
distortion" test under the pre-1979 law. The case involved regional development grants in
West Germany which benefited German float glass producers. See ASG Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1980), reversing 467 F. Supp. 1187 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
89. The closest the new law comes to the "trade distortion" concept is the requirement that
a domestic subsidy be provided to a specific enterprise or industry. See 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1677(5)(B) (West 1980). The Act thus excludes general government benefits such as public
education and public works.
90. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(6) (West 1980). For clear evidence that Congress intended to nar-
row and restrict permissible offsets, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 85-86; HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 77, at 74.
91. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 86. That Treasury had allowed such offsets in the
past is evident in ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
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3. Suspension of Liquidation
The addition of a provisional remedy, borrowed from prior practice
under the antidumping law and not available under the escape clause,
makes the new countervailing duty law especially attractive to domestic in-
dustry. The ITC has forty-five days, and Commerce has eighty-five days
from the date of the complaint to make preliminary determinations whether
there, is a "reasonable indication" of injury and subsidization, respec-
tively.92 At this stage, the test is weaker than for the final decisions.93 If
these determinations are positive, customs officers suspend liquidation of
entries, and the importer must post security for the estimated amount of
countervailing duty.94 This estimated duty immediately dampens imports,
and the possibility of even higher final levies increases the dampening ef-
fect. Under prior antidumping practice, the uncertainty surrounding sus-
pension of liquidation (formerly withholding of appraisal) frequently
caused imports to cease altogether. 95
4. Procedure and Judicial Review
The strict time limits placed on countervailing duty decisions and the
express authorization for Customs Court review of various preliminary and
final decisions should also encourage resort to the new law. These provi-
sions should deny the enforcing agencies, particularly the Commerce De-
partment, the range of discretion previously exercised by Treasury in
defining "bounty or grant," and thus increase the certainty of relief. This
reduced discretion contrasts sharply with that exercised by the President
under the escape clause.
There are four primary stages in a countervailing duty proceeding
under the new law. First, a petition is filed simultaneously with Commerce
92. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(a), (b) (West 1980). In "extraordinarily complicated cases," as
defined by the statute, the deadline for the preliminary determination that a subsidy exists may
be deferred 150 days. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(c) (West 1980).
93. Indeed, the Senate Report indicates that the standard "whether there is a reasonable
basis to believe or suspect" is less rigid than that applied by Treasury in preliminary determi-
nations under the antidumping law. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 50.
94. 19 U.S.C.A. § 167 1b(d) (West 1980). If the ITC determines that there is a reasonable
basis to believe that "critical circumstances" exist, it may suspend liquidation retroactively on
unliquidated items entered up to 90 days prior to the preliminary decision triggering the provi-
sional remedy. Critical circumstances exist when the ITC finds a subsidy inconsistent with the
Subsidies Code (presumably an export subsidy) and "massive imports" of the subsidized goods
"over a relatively short period." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(e)(l)(A)-(B) (West 1980).
95. See Prosterman, Withholding ofAppraisement Under the United States Antidumping
Act: Protectionism or Unfair-Competiton Law 41 WASH. L. REv. 315, 319 (1966).
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and the ITC.9 6 It must allege both the existence of a subsidy and material
injury.97 In addition, it must contain supporting information "reasonably
available to the petitioner."98 Within twenty days Commerce must de-
cide-based on the sufficiency of the complaint-whether to initiate an in-
vestigation.
Second, the ITC and Commerce must decide preliminarily on injury
and the existence of a subsidy, respectively. The tests are whether there is a
"reasonable indication" of injury and whether there is a "reasonable basis
to believe" a subsidy exists. 99 If both decisions are positive, Commerce or-
ders suspension of liquidation.1t° A negative preliminary finding by the
ITC (on injury) causes the proceeding to terminate.' 0l A negative prelimi-
nary decision solely by Commerce (on the presence of a subsidy) means
that liquidation is not suspended, but the investigation continues.
Third, Commerce and the ITC must make respective final decisions on
the existence of a subsidy and injury.10 2 The Act provides different time
limits depending upon whether the preliminary Commerce decision is posi-
tive or negative.' 0 3 In any event, no case may continue longer than 235
days after the petition is filed, or 300 days in an "extraordinarily compli-
cated" case. ° 4 Should both final decisions be positive, customs officers
must levy countervailing duties (equal to the net subsidy) on all offending
imports upon which duties have not been liquidated.' 05
Fourth, each of the above decisions and several other interlocutory de-
cisions are subject to Customs Court review on petition by either party. 0 6
The review process begins within thirty days of the challenged decision,
not, as under prior law, only when an entry is liquidated. 10 7 This gives the
domestic industry the opportunity for rapid reversal of negative prelimi-
nary decisions which may.have terminated a proceeding or failed to sus-
pend liquidation. The Customs Court may also protect an industry
96. 19 U.S.C.A. § 167 1a(b) (West 1980). The new Act grants standing to file a petition to
a domestic producer, a union or group of workers in the industry, and a trade association in
the industry. Id.; 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(9) (West 1980).
97. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671a(b)(1), 1671(a) (West 1980).
98. Id. § 1671a(b)(1).
99. Id. § 167lb(a)-(b).
100. Id. § 1671b(d).
101. Id. § 1671b(a).
102. Id. § 1671d.
103. Compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671d(b)(2) (West 1980) (affirmative preliminary determina-
tion) with id. § 1671d(b)(3)(negative preliminary determination).
104. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 56.
105. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671e (West 1980).
106. Id. § 1516a.
107. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 250.
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complainant by enjoining liquidation during the period of review.108
The Act excludes de novo review as a standard in countervailing duty
proceedings.10 9 In challenges to various initial or preliminary decisions
when a formal record would not be well-developed, the standard of review
is whether the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.""10 The standard for challenges to
final decisions is whether the decision is "unsupported by substantial evi-
dence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."'I The rec-
ord for review must contain all information acquired by government
officials during the course of the proceeding, including all government
memoranda pertaining to the countervailing duty case.' 12 The Act pre-
serves the confidential status of certain information, although the reviewing
court may examine such information in camera.1 13
Neither standard of review formulation makes clear (if that is indeed
possible) the degree of deference the Customs Court should give to Com-
merce and ITC decisions. The Senate Report suggests that the standard of
review should coincide with traditional administrative law principles."14
Thus, the Customs Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency, and should proceed upon the basis of relevant information before
the decision-maker at the time the decision was rendered. Nevertheless, the
elaborate provisions for judicial review, as well as its increased availability,
will tend to restrict agency discretion and flexibility.
5. Suspension of Proceeding by Acceptance of Agreement
The new law strongly encourages the United States to reach a negoti-
ated settlement with the subsidizing country or individual exporters. This
accords with the provisions and spirit of the Subsidies Code.1 5 During the
twenty-day delay between the filing of the petition and initiation of the pro-
ceeding, the United States should notify the appropriate government and
108. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(c)(2) (West 1980).
109. Id. § 1516a(b); SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 247-48, 251-52; HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 77, at 181. This overturns the result in several recent decisions holding under prior
law that review of countervailing duty cases should be de novo. See, e.g., ASG Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 610 F.2d 770 (C.C.P.A. 1980); ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.
Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979); Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 469 F. Supp. 270 (Cust. Ct.
1979).
110. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a(b)(1)(A) (West 1980).
111. Id. § 1516a(b)(1)(B).
112. Id. § 1516a(b)(2)(A).
113. Id. § 1516a(b)(2)(B).
114. SENATE REPORT, supra note 59, at 252.
115. See Subsidies Code, supra note 2, arts. 3, 4(5), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 266-67, 268-69.
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begin consultations.1 16 Should Commerce accept an agreement with the
subsidizing government or foreign exporters: (1) to eliminate or offset the
subsidy completely on exports to the United States; (2) to cease exports of
the bounty-fed product to the United States; or (3) in "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" to "eliminate completely the injurious effect" of the subsidized
exports to the United States, it may suspend the proceeding.' 17
Such agreements appear especially likely when the complaint involves
an export subsidy prohibited under the Code. In such a case, the Track II
procedure places the burden on the subsidizing country to show an absence
of injury.' 18 Since that burden will generally be very difficult to meet, the
offending country may simply agree to eliminate the subsidy on exports to
the United States. In any event, the pressure under the Code procedure, if
it is invoked, will be in that direction.
This overview underscores that the new countervailing duty law is dis-
tinctly more hostile to subsidized imports than is the escape clause to non-
subsidized trade. The next two sections examine whether such hostility to
bounty-fed imports is consistent with liberal trade policy. The analysis con-
siders separately the justification for countervailing against domestic and
export subsidies.
B. COUNTERVAILING AGAINST DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES
The argument for countervailing against domestic subsidies rests upon
two propositions: first, that foreign production subsidies are distortive" 9
(inefficient); and second, that it is unfair to force American producers to
compete with foreign firms propped up by subsidies. 120 The distortion ar-
gument is less persuasive than the fairness point, even without considering
why an importing country should care about distortions abroad.12'
One cannot assume, apori that a domestic subsidy is inefficient or
distortive. First, as discussed above, a domestic subsidy may be precisely
the policy needed to correct a prior market distortion.122 For example, if
116. Id. art. 3(1), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 266.
117. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671c (West 1980).
118. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., SENATE REPoRT, supra note 59, at 37; H. MALMGREN, supra note 17, at 28-
29.
120. See, e.g., W. WALKER, supra note 17, at 10-11; Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Hear-
ings Before the Subcoma. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 31-33 (1979) (statement of the Ad Hoc Subsidies Coalition); Walters & Monsen, State-
Owned Business Abroad& New Competitive Threat, 57 HAav. Bus. REv. 160, 164-67 (March-
Apr. 1979).
121. For the effects of foreign distortions on an importing country, see notes 133-39 infra
and accompanying text.
122. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
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wage rates are artificially high because of the monopoly power of unions, a
wage subsidy would correct the distortion and improve efficiency. Second,
a domestic subsidy is often an appropriate government tool for pursuing
national socio-economic goals (collective goods). Pursuit of such goals may
well be the raison d'etre of government. 123
Suppose Utopia grants two kinds of domestic subsidy: one to research
and development, and a second to any industry locating in a depressed re-
gion. The first is intended to insure that Utopia maintains a high level of
technological innovation, because, among other reasons, Utopia wants to
produce the products of the modern world. The second is aimed at decen-
tralizing industry to less advanced regions and at redistributing wealth to
the populace of those regions. Such goals are not presumptively "inef-
ficent" or "distortive," if Utopia as a nation desires them. The subsidy con-
stitutes, in effect, collective payment for a collective good.
Suppose several firms manufacturing CB radios locate in the appropri-
ate Utopian region and benefit from both kinds of subsidy. Why should the
United States impose a countervailing duty upon CB's from Utopia at the
point of second-level injury to the American CB industry? First-level in-
jury occurs when short-term injury to the American industry outweighs
short-term benefits to American consumers. At this point an escape clause
remedy is available, at the discretion of the President. There is no apparent
increased cost to the United States inherent in the Utopian subsidies that
would justify trade barriers at only second-level injury. Justification for
imposing countervailing duties against the subsidized products does not lie
in notions of economic inefficiency or distortion.
The strongest argument for imposing such restrictions against domestic
subsidies rests on claims of fairness. There are two strands to the argument.
One concerns a government-to-government balance of interests; the other
concerns fairness issues at the private firm level.
All GATT countries share similar socio-economic goals, often pursued
through subsidy programs. All governments seek to avoid excessive unem-
ployment and economic dislocation, to promote technological innovation
and enhanced productivity, to aid, at least temporarily, ailing industries, to
boost depressed regions or to prevent vulnerable regions from becoming
depressed. Pursuit of such goals through production subsidies in country.4,
however, may interfere with or raise the cost of achieving the same goals in
country B.
Problems of inter-governmental policy conflicts of this sort demand
some framework or mechanism of harmonization. The European Commu-
123. See generaly C. KINDLEBERGER, GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1978).
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nity has approached the problem of conflicting domestic aids by seeking
first, transparency in government aids so their effects can be measured; sec-
ond, agreed quantitative limits on aid of different kinds; and finally, a pro-
gram for gradual reduction of aids that are excessive.' 24 Similar
agreements may ultimately be needed at the GATT level. Until such agree-
ments are reached, however, the ad hoc approach of the government-to-
government complaint procedure in Track II of the Code seems a reason-
able alternative.. When the complaint involves a domestic subsidy, one
touchstone under Track II will be whether the subsidized imports are caus-
ing "material injury" (not necessarily the weak second-level test under the
1979 Act) to the importing country's industry. A second may be whether
the subsidy "adversely affect[s] the conditions of normal competition."' 25
The Committee of Signatories may find it convenient to develop this last
concept to increase the flexibility of the dispute settlement process. Similar
concepts play a role in both the European Community's and the European
Free Trade Association's mechanisms for settlement of disputes over do-
mestic subsidies. 126
None of this, however, is an argument for automatic countervailing
duties whenever production subsidies abroad cause second-level injury in
the United States. Not all foreign production subsidies are irresponsible or
increase significantly the cost of pursuing domestic American policies. An
important feature of the Track II procedure is the government's discretion
as to when and how hard to press a claim. In contrast, countervailing duties
under the 1979 law are triggered automatically at second-level injury. Con-
flicting government policies extraneous to the countervailing duty law itself
do not explain this result.
A further claim for the countervailing duty regime rests upon notions
of inequality and fair play at the private firm level. Domestic producers
argue that it is unfair for them to compete against an entire foreign govern-
ment or against foreign competitors propped up by subsidies. The United
124. See generally COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY (1972); SECOND REPORT (1973); THIRD REPORT (1974); FOURTH REPORT
(1975); FIFTH REPORT (1976); SIXTH REPORT (1977); SEVENTH REPORT (1978); EIGHTH RE-
PORT (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N REPORTS]; H. MALMGREN, supra note 17, at 13-15.
125. Subsidies Code, supra note 2, art. 11(2), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 280-81.
126. In the European Community, the equivalent concept is "aid ... which distorts...
competition." See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 92, opened
for signature March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 51. See generally COMM'N REPORTS, supra
note 124; H. MALMGREN, supra note 17, at 13-15. In the European Free Trade Association,
the concept is "frustration of benefits." See Convention Establishing the European Free Trade
Association, art. 16(1), January 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 5, 16; H. MALMGREN, sura note 17, at
11-13. See generally R. MIDDLETON, NEGOTIATING ON NON-TARIFF DISTORTIONS OF TRADE
(1975).
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States requires its own producers to comply with the competitive market
model--survival of the most efficient-and favors free trade as an extension
of that principle. On the other hand, the expanded market, absent counter-
vailing duty laws, brings in competitors who play by different rules and
who are not subject to the discipline of the market. Common sense notions
of fair play seem violated.
There are two primary weaknesses, however, in this fairness argument.
First, if one includes the effects of all government action, not just isolated
subsidies, the balance of fairness to any group of producers, domestic or
foreign, becomes quite unclear or indeterminate. 127 Government action
both at home and abroad benefits industry in innumerable ways: through
public roads and education, sound fiscal and monetary management, main-
tenance of law and order, and so on. As these actions filter through, no one
can say which firms derive a relative net benefit or burden. Of course, gov-
emnment policies with very generalized effects on an economy could easily
be merged into the general background of factor endowments which condi-
tion all national output and thus, for trade purposes, ignored. 12 8 The 1979
Act in fact excludes from the subsidy definition government benefits with
widespread economic effects.' 29 Selective subsidies with visible, particular-
ized effects, on the other hand, might be thought to raise the fairness prob-
lem more acutely.
Even accepting such an imprecise notion of inequality, however, there
is a second weakness in the argument. Equalizing the terms of competitive
rivalry between American and foreign firms imposes costs on American
consumers. That is one of the clearest truths to emerge from the theory of
comparative advantage. Any attempt to neutralize through a tariff either a
"natural" advantage abroad, such as cheap labor, or a so-called "unnatu-
ral" advantage, such as a government subsidy, is not neutral in its effect on
the American consumer. Even a competing subsidy to the American pro-
ducer, although theoretically less costly than a tariff, would still distort pro-
duction and impose an indirect cost on the consumer.
A staunch free trader would urge an importing country to pursue its
own socio-economic goals, including redistribution of income (from con-
sumers to producers, for example) through internal tax, subsidy, fiscal,
127. For a similar argument supporting the view that countervailing duties are without
justification, see Schwartz, supra note 20, at 307.
128. See Cooper, The Nexus Among Foreign Trade, investment, and Balance-of-Payments
.Adjustment, in II UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPEN-
DENT WORLD 515, 522-23 (U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Trade and Investment Policy, ed. 1971).
129. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)(B) (West 1980).
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monetary, and other policies chosen without regard toforeign subsidies.130
An importing country might want to limit injurious imports temporarily,
but the cause of low prices on such imports should not influence the deci-
sion. In the long run, cheap imports increase the wealth of the importing
nation, regardless of why they are cheap.
The clash between this argument and the anti-subsidy view is essen-
tially a dispute over how much a country should pay for an imprecise no-
tion of "fairness," which seems in part to require redistribution of income
from consumers to producers because a foreign country, through its sub-
sidy, has chosen a similar redistribution of income to its own producers.
The weakness of such a fairness claim suggests that the 1979 countervailing
duty law is weighted too heavily toward the "fairness" pole of the fairness-
free trade continuum. The 1979 law is automatic; it provides no room for
flexibility and executive discretion; it gives, in effect, permanent relief; and
it is triggered at second-level injury. A different balance along that contin-
uum would impose fewer costs on the consumer, without ignoring the wel-
fare of producers and workers disadvantaged by imports.
Given the weakness of the fairness claim, one can make a strong argu-
ment for outright repeal of the countervailing duty law. Market disruption
from imports would then be handled exclusively under the escape clause
and adjustment assistance provisions, with no concern for the cause of low
prices on imports. This would save the consumer not only the cost of exces-
sive protectionism, but also the administrative cost of deciding whether im-
ports have been subsidized and the causal consequences thereof--often
complex issues requiring costly administrative determinations.
To give at least some recognition to the fairness claim of producers,
one could argue for a more costly approach, but one stopping short of an
inflexible countervailing duty law. This could involve a gentle modification
of the escape clause. Once the ITC finds first-level injury under that clause,
the President could be instructed, in the exercise of his discretion, to take
into account whether the injurious imports are subsidized. An agency
would, of course, need to report to the President whether a subsidy exists
and the degree to which the subsidized imports are the source of the injury.
Thus, some of the administrative cost of a countervailing duty law would
be incurred. But provisions for elaborate judicial review would seem un-
necessary. Presumably, the President could give more or less weight to the
subsidy factor, depending upon the degree of causal nexus between the in-
jury and subsidized imports. The President could also have discretion to
impose duties only against the subsidized imports, but in that case presuma-
130. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 304-08 (arguing that no convincing case can be made
for having a countervailing duty law).
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bly only in the amount of the subsidy. To avoid abuse and to broaden the
base of opinion controlling the decision whether to grant relief, Congress
could retain its power under the current escape clause to override the Presi-
dent by adopting any contrary relief originally recommended by the ITC.
The discretionary solution just suggested seems an apt response to the
ambiguity of a producer's fairness claim that imposes direct costs on inno-
cent consumers. It also recognizes the potential for counter-reaction in the
subsidizing country. The need for intergovernmental consultation and ne-
gotiation seems hardly less urgent here than when ordinary escape clause
action is taken, although technically under the GATT rules the subsidizing
country would have no automatic right of retaliation.13 ' Moreover, a mod-
ified escape clause approach would emphasize injury to producers within
the United States, not actions in a foreign country. Also, triggering relief
only at first-level injury would preserve low prices to consumers until short-
term injury to producers outweighs benefits to consumers-the point at
which restricting trade enhances overall national welfare.' 3 2
One caveat should be raised. The logic of the proposals just outlined
requires that the current standards of first-level injury be maintained. If a
merger of countervailing and escape clause standards were politically feasi-
ble only in exchange for a diluted injury test, consumers on balance might
gain nothing. The current dual level injury test seems preferable to a
weaker test for all trade.
C. COUNTERVAILING AGAINST EXPORT SUBSIDIES
The case against export subsidies differs from that against domestic
subsidies, because the former are presumptively distortive and inefficient.
Export subsidies misallocate resources in the producing country and misdis-
131. Compare GATT Art. VI (countervailing duties) and Subsidies Code, supra note 2,
with GATT Art. XIX (escape clause). For a discussion of compensation and retaliation under
the GATT escape clause, see J. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 564-66.
132. This proposal differs somewhat from an earlier proposal offered by the author for
countervailing against domestic subsidies. See Barcel6, supra note 18, at 842-46. The major
point of the earlier proposal--the need for an injury test-is now recognized in the 1979 law.
The earlier proposal suggested a first-level test for degree of injury but a second-level causa-
tion link. This would have aligned the countervailing duty test with the weaker causation link
applied for adjustment assistance (domestic subsidies to ailing firms). First, it seemed appro-
priate to authorize trade barriers against subsidized imports whenever competing subsidies in
the United States were an authorized remedy. Second, it also seemed fairer to third country
exporters, who plainly would prefer that subsidized imports be countered with countervailing
duties rather than competing subsidies. On reflection, however, the argument for tariff-like
protection seems persuasive only at the first-level point for both degree of injury and causal
link to imports. Short of this point the government may provide adjustment assistance to
individual firms who are more seriously injured than the industry as a whole. A Track II
proceeding is also now available to protect the interests of third country exporters.
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tribute the output between the domestic and foreign markets. They are not
appropriate as corrections for prior market distortions-at least not internal
market distortions-nor as tools for internal socio-economic goals. In
short, they are inconsistent with comparative advantage and reduce global
welfare.133
It follows that the GATT countries as a whole would be wealthier if all
export subsidies were eliminated. 134 The welfare effect on individual coun-
tries is more complex, however, especially if only some, but not all, export
subsidies are eliminated. Any country refusing to subsidize its exports will
avoid distortions and inefficiencies and be better off. The effect on import-
ing countries, however, is less clear.
A single country countervailing duty law will generally not improve
the welfare of the importing country. It is true that the inefficiencies of
foreign export subsidies may indirectly increase costs to an importing coun-
try. The misallocation of resources and misdistribution of output in the
subsidizing country will cause higher prices in that country for some non-
subsidized products (subsidy-disadvantaged goods). 135 The importing
country might therefore pay more to import any of these products or third-
country products incorporating them as components. Nevertheless, the im-
porting country would also receive a cheaper price on the subsidized goods.
The cost-benefit balance here would never be wholly determinable. If
country .4 subsidized its exports only to country B, consumers in B would
unambiguously benefit. They would substitute cheaper subsidized imports
for more expensive subsidy-disadvantaged imports only if this improved
their welfare. Normally, however, country A would subsidize exports to
third countries as well. Thus, higher payments by country B for subsidy-
disadvantaged imports would, in effect, partly underwrite the subsidized ex-
ports from A going to other countries.
The distortion-generated costs just identified are not, however, an ex-
planation for the second-level injury test under the 1979 countervailing
duty law. A countervailing duty will not eliminate those costs, because it
will not prevent export subsidies on trade with third countries. Thus, ineffi-
ciencies will persist. Indeed, importing-country consumers will have the
worst of both worlds: higher prices through added duties on the subsidized
product, and higher prices on the subsidy-disadvantaged imports. A coun-
tervailing duty regime would contribute to increased efficiency only if the
133. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
134. See Barcel6, supra note 18, at 794-801. The exceptions to this principle are discussed
in id. at 801-35.
135. Higher costs in the subsidizing country will also prevail for products which incorpo-
rate the goods receiving an export subsidy, since its domestic price will be driven up.
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threat of countervailing duties from several importing countries deterred
the use of export subsidies altogether. A rule obligating all countries to
countervail against export subsidies might seem to promise that result, butimporting countries to whom cheap imports were a pure benefit would have
a strong incentive not to take that obligation seriously.
Of the current Code rules, the Track II provisions are the most likely to
improve efficiency by deterring export subsidies, especially when several
countries join a complaint that concerns third-country markets. Recall that
the subsidizing country would have the burden of showing no adverse ef-
fects to the complainants in those markets. 3 6 Even if the offending country
removed the subsidy only on trade with certain third countries, and not
completely, a complaining country would gain. Its more efficient export
trade with the affected third countries would improve at no cost to its con-
sumers.
If a country invokes Track II to attack an export subsidy on its imports,
instead of on third-country trade, the analysis is identical to that for coun-
tervailing duties. Under either Track II or a countervailing duty proceed-
ing, the subsidizing country is likely to remove the subsidy, but only on the
complainant's import trade. In fact the new countervailing duty law espe-
cially encourages this result by allowing termination of an investigation if
the offending country agrees to drop the subsidy on exports to the United
States. 13 7 The upshot of this, however, will merely be increased costs to the
American consumer, not improved efficiency.
Thus, even in the case of export subsidies, avoidance of distortions is
not a persuasive argument for a single-country countervailing duty law. On
the other hand, the fairness argument, which had weak persuasive force in
the context of domestic subsidies, might seem stronger when addressed to
export subsidies, because they are more aggressive and outward-looking.
This may be reflected in the hostility of the 1979 Act to export subsidies.
Not only is the Act especially explicit in defining subsidies as all items on
the prohibited Code list (all export subsidies), but it also invites a finding of
at least "threat of material injury" if an export subsidy inconsistent with the
Code is used.'3 8 There are no similar provisions for domestic subsidies.
The proposals advanced above for the merger of countervailing duty
and escape clause relief are nevertheless sound, even in the case of export
subsidies. If the fairness argument is weightier when dealing with export
subsidies, it is essentially because of government-to-government considera-
tions, not fairness claims of the private firm. On government-to-govern-
136. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 115-18 supra and accompanying text.
138. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(E)(i) (West 1980).
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ment issues, Track II would be the appropriate remedy. Moreover,
attempts to deter export subsidies and raise the welfare of all GATT coun-
tries also seem best left to a Track II complaint, particularly against loss of
third-country markets.1 39 Of course, if the United States were forced to
retaliate under Track II, the consumer would again pay higher prices. But
at least the negotiating objective would be the removal of subsidies which
impose unambiguous costs on the United States, ie., foreign export subsi-
dies which displace American shipments to third countries.
IV
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES
The 1979 Act has broadly harmonized the antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws. The President's reorganization plan has substituted the
Commerce Department for the Treasury as the agency for determining
dumping, 140 or sales at less than fair value, but the Act has not significantly
changed the applicable concepts and standards. Technically, the new Act
abolishes the Antidumping Act of 1921,141 but it reenacts almost all of the
prior law."42 The ITC injury decision in a dumping case follows the same
standards described above for a countervailing duty case.143 The procedu-
ral pattern, including extensive judicial review, 144 is the same.
This author has previously argued that dumping (a private firm deci-
sion to charge less for export than for home market sales) is not unfair or
undesirable unless the practice is predatory."45 The earlier discussion did
not address directly any fairness arguments of the sort just discussed con-
cerning subsidies, because it is difficult to imagine a plausible claim that
private firm differential pricing in response to different market conditions
raises a serious issue of inequality or lack of fair play at either the govern-
ment-to-government or private firm levels. Claims that dumping arises be-
139. This treatment of export subsidies under countervailing duty laws differs from that
proposed by the author in an earlier article. See Barcel6, supra note 18, at 799-801. The
earlier article recommended prohibiting export subsidies and, as a deterrent to their use, re-
quiring GATT signatories to countervail against them. The alternate proposal, on the assump-
tion that the GATT countries would not agree to mandatory countervailing duties, was to
authorize such action without an injury test. The objective was deterrence, not directly im-
proved efficiency within the importing country. Now that Track II of the Code has been
adopted, however, it seems more consistent with liberal trade policy to look to complaints of
loss of market share in third countries as the major source of deterrence to export subsidies.
140. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, § 5, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979).
141. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106, 93 Stat. 144.
142. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1673-1673i, 1677-1677b (West 1980).
143. Compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West 1980) (antidumping), with 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)
(West 1980) (countervailing duties). See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
144. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516a (West 1980).
145. Barcel6, supra note 79, at 64-65.
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cause of government export subsidies are really discussions of the subsidy
problem. Similarly, claims that dumping results from enhanced monopoly
power of foreign firms brought on by protectionism abroad should really be
concerned with the cause (protectionism) rather than the symptom (dump-
ing).146
The earlier argument urged repeal of the antidumping law. It sug-
gested that producers could rely instead on section 2 of the Sherman Act
and the escape clause for protection against predatory dumping.147 Alter-
natively, the article urged Congress to amend the antidumping law to incor-
porate an antitrust concept of "injury to competition"--instead of to
competitors-similar to that applicable under the domestic Robinson-Pat-
man Act. 148
The changes in the antidumping law under the 1979 Act move in the
opposite direction. Although the 1921 Antidumping Act, now repealed,
was amenable to an antitrust interpretation, the 1979 Act is not. It adopts
the weak second-level injury threshold and prescribes an ordinary business
injury test, that is, loss of sales, falling prices, loss of profits, and so on.149 It
rejects an "injury to competition" standard.
From a liberal trade standpoint, the Tokyo Round Antidumping
Code' 5 0 also amends the original 1967 Kennedy Round Code 15 in the
wrong direction. The original Code required that dumping be the princiole
cause of material injury, entailing a weighing of the effects of dumping
against the effects of all other causes of injury.' 52 To conform to the weaker
injury test under the Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Code, the new An-
tidumping Code eliminates the word "principle" and the "weighing of
causes" concept. 153 Thus, a constraint on finding injury from dumping has
been removed.
The antidumping law under the 1979 Act (and under the new Code)
thus resembles a surrogate escape clause with a soft injury test and a
streamlined, automatic remedy. As such it has a strong protectionist cast.
146. Id. at 76-77.
147. Id. at 66-67.
148. Id. at 67-69.
149. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7) (West 1980).
150. 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 2, H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 311.
151. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431 (effective July 1, 1968) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1967 Antidumping Code]. The 1967 Antidumping Code is reprinted in 32 Fed.
Reg. 14,962 (1967) and in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 920 (1967).
152. 1967 Antidumping Code, supra note 151, art. 3(a), 19 U.S.T. at 4351, T.I.A.S. 6431, at
3.
153. 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 2, art. 3(4), H.R. Doc. No. 153, at 315.
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CONCLUSION
This discussion of subsidies, countervailing duties and antidumping
has implicitly ranked the different parts of the new unfair trade law of the
United States in the following order of decreasing consistency with liberal
trade policy: (1) trade retaliation under amended section 301; (2) counter-
vailing duty law under the 1979 Act; and (3) antidumping law under the
new Act. To justify harsher treatment of unfair by comparison with fair
trade, the analysis sought some concept of "extra cost" to the complaining
country captured by the notion of wrongfulness underlying the unfair trade
practice laws.
Subsidies unambiguously increase costs to a complaining country only
when they displace that country's exports, not when they cause cheap im-
ports. When a country loses part of its export trade, it must reduce its im-
ports or purchase them at a higher price by exporting products on which its
comparative advantage is lower. An export-displacing subsidy also offers
no offsetting benefit to the complainant through cheaper prices on imports.
Thus, opposition to such subsidies, the primary domain of the trade retalia-
tion law (Track II of the Code), is sound.
When subsidies feed imports, the importing country will not be pre-
sumptively injured. This is so, even if a distortive export subsidy is in-
volved. Here the importing country may indeed experience higher prices
on subsidy-disadvantaged imports, those produced less efficiently because
of distortive subsidies on other products. These costs, however, must be
weighed against the lower price (or its equivalent) on the subsidized im-
ports. The net cost-benefit outcome to the importing country will generally
be ambiguous. Thus, harsh reaction to subsidized imports, the domain of
countervailing duty law (Track I of the Code), cannot be convincingly
grounded on avoidance of extra costs to the importing country owing to
distortions or inefficiencies. The equity and fair play argument for counter-
vailing duties raises different problems.
The fairness issue at one level involves clashing policies of different
countries. In this context Track II and the trade retaliation provisions of
the 1979 Act again seem to offer the soundest approach, one involving mul-
tilateral scrutiny and a framework for negotiated compromise. If an export
subsidy is at issue, the subsidizing country bears the burden of proving the
absence of adverse effects to the trade of complaining countries. The com-
plainant bears the burden in the case of a domestic subsidy.
The fairness issue under the countervailing duty law, on the other
hand, involves trade-offs between producers and consumers in the import-
ing country. Fairness to the producer means higher costs to the consumer.
The current tradeoff between those interests, reflected in the automaticity
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and soft injury test of the 1979 countervailing duty law, seems weighted
toward protectionism. This article recommends either repealing the coun-
tervailing duty law or replacing it with a gently modified escape clause.
The President could be required, in deciding whether to grant relief under
the escape clause, to take into account the existence of subsidies and their
contribution to the injury. This proposal would impose fewer costs upon
the consumer while taking account of producer fairness claims when they
are compelling.
The same automaticity and soft injury standards which seem out of
place for countervailing duties inhere in the new antidumping law, without
the justification of even a weak fairness argument for opposing dumping.
Thus the antidumping law seems especially protectionist.
CORNELL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL
Volume 13 Summer 1980 Number 2
OFFICERS
WILLIAM W. SCHROEDER
Editor-in-Chief
PETER I. FRIEDENBERG
JONATHAN H. GEORGE
MARY BRIGID MCMANAMON
Managing Editors
JOHN C. PEIRCE
Article & Book Review Editor
ALAN D. SCHEER
Business Editor
DAVID W. AMBROSIA
ROBERT K. ANDERBERG
DAVID A. BAILEY
ERIC L. BERG
DARYL P. BRAUTIGAM
JAMES E. BRAZA
DANIEL C. BRENNAN
JOSEPH A. CALABRESE
KEVIN J. CULLIGAN
DAVID T. DEKKER
GEORGE H. DIPPEL
STEPHEN DUNEOAN
RICHARD L. EDWARDS
STEVEN M. FELDMAN
MATTHEW A. GABEL
WALTER T. GANGL
KEVIN W. GOERINO
STEVEN E. GRILL
BROOKS E. HARLOW
FREDERICK T. HAWKES
JORIS M. HOGAN
STEVEN B. ISAACSON
DOUGLAS H. LASDON
THADDEUS J. LEWKOWICZ
EDWARD J. LINDNER
DORIS E. LONG
BOARD OF EDITORS
SUSAN D. GOLAND
SANDRA E. LORIMER
ALICIA PLOTKIN
Note & Comment Editors
DAVID A. FRANKEL
STEPHEN R. SEELY
Research Editors
WILLIAM J. LYNN III
SUSAN L. MENDENHALL
JENNIFER L. MILLER
STEPHANIE J. MITCHELL
MARY K. MULLENHOFF
JOANNE MURPHY
HOWARD J.C. NICOLS
PAUL H. ODE, JR.
TERENCE J. PELL
STUART J. RAPPAPORT
RALPH A. SAGGIOMO
RICHARD A. SAMUELS
ROBERT F. SHARPE, JR.
MICHAEL J. SMITH
MICHAEL S. SMITH
CHRISTOPHER J. SOELLING
ROBERT G. SOUAID
JANET G. SPECK
CHARLES B. STOCKDALE
ELIZABETH W. TAYLOR
MICHAEL N. WILCOVE
JEFFREY G. WRIGHT
CHARLES R. WUNSCH
JOSEPH C. WYDERKO
STEPHEN W. YALE-LOEHR
JOHN J. BARCEL6 III, Faculty Advsor
ELIZABETH M. LENNIHAN, Secretary
The Journal is pleased to announce the election of Officers for Volume 14, 1980-81: STEPHEN W. YALE-
LOEHR, Editor-in-Chif JAMES E. BRAZA, KEVIN W. GOERING, and MICHAEL S. SMITH, Managing Editors;
JOSEPH A. CALABRSE, Article & Book Review Editor; MARY K. MULLENHOFF, ELIZABETH W. TAYLOR, and
CHARLES R. WUNSCH, Note & Comment Editors; STEVEN M. FELDMAN and JEFFREY G. WRIGHT, Research
Editors; JOSEPH C. WYDERKO, Business Editor.

